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Politik and Pilkada
Until recently, politik was a dirty word in Indonesia, “marked by a sinister tonality
acquired after the political killings of the mid-1960s” (Pemberton, 1994, p. 4; see also
Antlov, 2003, p. 75). After the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the end of his New Order
[Orde Baru] regime, four changes of president in the following six years, and the succes-
sive programs of reformasi [reform], demokratisasi [democratisation] and desentralisasi
[decentralisation], however, politics is back in the public domain. In Bali, where a
studied apoliticism was raised to the level of an art sanctioned by religion (MacRae,
2003); the political has re-entered public life more gradually, with public figures now step-
ping into the formal political arena as candidates in free elections.
The national process of desentralisasi and demokratisasi saw the heads of districts
[bupati] and city mayors [walikota], along with their deputies, elected for the first time
in 2005 by popular vote rather than appointed from above. In Bali the first such election
(Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, commonly abbreviated to Pilkada, or Pilkadal in which the
final “l” stands for langsung [direct]) in June 2005 offers some insights into the repoliti-
cisation of Indonesian society in general. It also highlights a distinctly Balinese approach
to this new political era. The campaign leading up to the election drew on a combination of
elements of traditional Balinese political order and new formations of power made poss-
ible by the mass media.1
In June 2005, Pilkada were held in four of the eight districts [kabupaten] of Bali
(Badung, Bangli, Tabanan and Karangasem) as well as in the main city, Denpasar. The
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candidates were affiliated with a range of parties, but the most visible were Golkar and
PDI-P.2 Some candidates were of aristocratic [triwangsa] descent; some were not. On
the face of it, differences in traditional status, long a significant axis of social tension
and political affiliation in Bali (Dwipayana, 2004, pp. 83–91, pp. 98–105; Picard,
2005; Vickers, 1989, pp. 150–55), now seemed to be subordinated to other differences.
Despite this, candidates of all parties, triwangsa or not, sought from the outset of their
campaigns to associate themselves publicly with and claim support from local traditional
elites [ puri].3 At the same time, members of puri, many of whom had been largely absent
from the formal political arena, put themselves forward as candidates.
All parties, candidates and factions sought to present themselves to the public via the
mass media, especially television, and specifically through the new, locally-owned Bali
TV channel. Since it opened in May 2002, Bali TV, as the channel of choice for many
Balinese, especially those of more conservative sensibility, has played a major role in
the formation of public opinion. It therefore emerged as a powerful player in the politics
of the 2005 Pilkada.
This article explores this emergent formation of political power in Bali and its novel
forms of affiliation and representation and locates them in the wider contexts of a contem-
porary crisis of cultural identity in Balinese society and the visual languages of traditional
politics. It addresses Jacqueline Vel’s pertinent questions: “Do the entrenched . . . elites
succeed in capturing the latest institution of democracy . . . or does a direct election
open up opportunities for new candidates?” (2005, p. 82). It also looks beyond such ques-
tions in two ways: first, it extends the notion of “elites” beyond those “entrenched” in the
New Order to those whose claims to legitimacy long predate it; second, it argues that while
such elites are, at least in Bali, adopting the techniques of modern politics, including use of
the mass media, the media themselves are adopting elements of the language of traditional
politics and in the process are making a claim to leadership in terms derived from tradition.
These arguments suggest that cultural factors, especially those of greater historical depth
than the New Order period, have been given too little attention in much of the literature
on contemporary politics in Indonesia, and that attempts to generalise about “Indonesian
politics” may seriously underestimate local variations.
Elites: Old and Older
In precolonial times Bali was ruled by an ever-shifting constellation of small and fractious
kingdoms. The Dutch colonial state took control of most of the island in the early years of
the twentieth century, first deposing the kings, and then reinstating them as indirect rulers
on their behalf.4 Either way, the kings effectively lost any real political power, maintaining
at most a degree of symbolic power based on socio-religious status. In the latter half of the
twentieth century, after independence, their descendants turned increasingly to modern
education and careers in business and the public service, and in some cases national poli-
tics. During Suharto’s New Order regime the top positions at all levels of government were
allocated from the top down and often went to non-locals, in many cases military officers.
While some of these were from local puri, the majority were not, and only the most local,
lowest-level positions tended to be occupied by local aristocrats. Aristocratic status was at
best secondary to positioning in the national political apparatus.5
Since the passing of the New Order, the hopes for a truly new “reformed” political
environment have been somewhat disappointed in many parts of the country by the survival
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of remnants of New Order formations of power, often thinly disguised under new names and
forms (Robison and Hadiz, 2004, p. 187, p. 217, p. 223; Vel, 2005). A largely unanticipated
aspect of the new politics all over Indonesia, though, has been a re-emergence into the
formal political arena of the traditional aristocracies that had been substantially marginalised
during the New Order period (Cribb, 2006; Dwipayana, 2004; Parker, 2003; Pedersen, 2006,
p. 281, van Klinken, 2006).6 In the 2005 Pilkada in Bali, it was members of various puri,
many of whom had little or no previous political experience, who stood as candidates for
most parties in the majority of electorates, rather than members of the New Order elites.7
While Pilkada provided a venue for this traditional elite to re-enter the political arena,
the axes of contest were not, as they have sometimes been in the past, between aristocratic
and non-aristocratic candidates (Picard, 2005), between rival puri (Dwipayana, 2004, pp.
128–29), or between powerful descent/caste groups.8 In 2005, ksatria, brahmana and
non-aristocratic candidates were often paired with each other in relations not always
aligned with caste hierarchy. These new alliances between triwangsa and non-triwangsa
candidates, and their patronage by other puri, led to a tangled web of cross-cutting affilia-
tions, especially for the mayoralty of Denpasar. Here, two of three pairs of candidates
(AA Ngurah Puspayoga and IB Rai Mantra; and AA Ngurah Widiada and AA
K. Sumawidana) were triwangsa, while the third pair, Made Sudharma (non-triwangsa)
and Ida Bagus Ketut Kiana (triwangsa) was mixed. In both Badung, and Tabanan candidates
were mixed jaba (lit. “outsider” ¼ non-triwangsa) and triwangsa. Only in Bangli were both
candidates non-triwangsa (W. Gunawan and W. Wirata; N. Arnawa and M. Gianyar).9 Simi-
larly, there were no clear correlations between traditional status and party affiliation. Affilia-
tions and alliances did not fall along easily read lines of class or caste. This appears to be a
new kind of politics, in which political capital based on past status is allied with newer forms
of political capital and with modern/democratic ideas of popular representation.
The aristocratic candidates utilised the political capital derived from tradition in various
ways and to varying degrees. At one extreme, a somewhat comic duo of unknowns from an
obscure branch palace in East Bali appeared on television. They were dressed in the
regalia of nineteenth-century kings and invoked solemn oaths and invocations of
loyalty and sacred duty, conveying a message along the lines of “vote for us because
we are your traditional rulers”. At the other, the widely respected head of one of the
former major kingdoms (Mengwi) spent a lot of time visiting rural communities through-
out his old kingdom asking farmers what he could do for them (and no doubt making gen-
erous donations to local causes). Meanwhile in the capital city the two main candidates
from powerful rival palaces pitched their campaigns largely to the concerns of their con-
temporary urban constituencies, while the politics of affiliation and alliance were played
out invisibly in the background.10
But all candidates, aristocratic or not, began their campaigns with visible visits to local
palaces seeking their support. The media often refer to these visits as dharma suaka and
simakrama. The former means “asking for blessing/support” and the latter refers to estab-
lishing ties of friendship. The words are old, but in the context of political campaigning they
represent an invented tradition: this relocates and redefines a practice known at the national
level as silahturahmi politik in distinctively Hindu-Balinese terms.11 From the point of
view of most Balinese such neo-traditional repackaging is unnecessary: it is easily recog-
nised in terms of nangkil ke puri [“presenting oneself at the palace”], a practice in which
anybody who wants anything, from material resources to spiritual blessing to wise
counsel, presents themselves at the palace of their king and asks for help (MacRae,
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1997, p. 115; Parker, 2003, pp. 29–30). This process is intended to provide benefits for the
petitioner. But it simultaneously has the social effect of recognising, publicly displaying
and thus reinforcing a hierarchical relationship between petitioner and host, client and
patron, subject and ruler.
Thus the old kingdoms re-emerged into the Pilkada, directly in the form of candidates,
but also symbolically, in the form of practices that brought the traditional spiritual
mandate of the royal houses into play as a factor in the political process. But the old
puri were not the only p(a)laces the candidates visited in search of support.
The Media and Politics12
After obtaining the blessings of their local puri, the next stop for most candidates was a
formal visit to the headquarters of the Bali Post Media Group (Kelompok Media Bali
Post, hereafter abbreviated to BPMG).13 BPMG is a locally-owned media conglomerate
based on the foundation of the island’s main newspaper Bali Post. Bali Post was founded
by Ketut Nadha in 1948 as Suara Indonesia, a local voice of the national independence
struggle and of pro-republican sentiment.14 After his death in January 2001, the ownership
and management of the paper were taken over by his only son Satria Naradha, a graduate of
the Academy of Journalism in Surabaya. During the transition period of management in the
late 1990s and especially after he took full control, Naradha expanded the business into other
newspapers and magazines (Den[pasar] Post, Bisnis Bali, Bali Travel News and Tokoh) and
radio stations (Global FM, Genta, Singaraja FM and Suara Besakih). But by far his most
important development has been the television channel Bali TV. 15
Throughout the New Order period media licences were limited by the government, as
was freedom of expression even for those with licences. Consequently there were rela-
tively few media outlets, and these were restricted in content and tone (Sen and Hill,
2000, p. 119). In practice in Bali, many did little more than report official events and
presidential pronouncements and show sanitised local cultural performances and politi-
cally innocuous foreign programs. News content was the most rigorously controlled
(Sen and Hill, 2000, p. 125). Those who diverged were severely punished, with closures
of magazines and imprisonment of editors (Sen and Hill, 2000, pp. 53–54; see also Grant,
1994). Towards the end of the regime this control was both contested and relaxed some-
what and the media played a significant role in the downfall of the Suharto regime (Sen
and Hill, 2000, p. 52, pp. 67–71, pp. 122–23, p. 130). Since then the licensing system
has been deregulated and restrictions have been largely (but by no means entirely)
lifted, diversity of opinion and expression have flourished, and new media outlets have
sprung up like mushrooms (Sen and Hill, 2000, p. 70, p. 132). The expansion of the
BPMG occurred in this new climate of deregulation and freedom.16
The most important part of the expansion of the media throughout Indonesia was the
opening of a number of commercial television channels. Those available in Bali, as else-
where, are mostly based in Jakarta and are oriented to the concerns, tastes and linguistic
habits of urban middle-class Javanese, all of which are remote from the cultural worlds of
the majority of Balinese. Bali TV by contrast was designed from the outset by Balinese for
Balinese: to speak to themselves about themselves and their concerns, in their own language.
Bali TV was founded on 26 May 2002 with considerable fanfare and an explicit vision:
“to give shape to a dynamic ideal of guarding the identity, space and process of Balinese
culture” (BPMG, 2005, cl.11.3). The timing was fortuitous: barely four months later the
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deadly bomb blasts in Kuta devastated not only the tourism-related economy but Balinese
perceptions of themselves, their relationships with the rest of Indonesia, Islam and indeed
the world and their future (Inside Indonesia, 2003). It was in this climate of loss of con-
fidence and direction, and in the absence of strong or inspiring leadership, that Bali TV,
together with Bali Post, took on a new role as the island’s guide through troubled times.
Bali Post is characterised by a prose style that is at best awkward, at worst almost
unreadable, the text broken into barely digestible chunks by long acronyms disguised as
ordinary-looking words.17 Its point of view, not surprisingly, is Bali-centric, and its poli-
tics conservative. But while there are alternative Bali-based newspapers (Nusa and Radar
Bali), even the critics of Bali Post agree that it is essential reading because it provides the
only broad and reliable coverage of most important events and issues in Bali.18 Bali TV is
likewise conservative and highly Bali-centric. The only other locally based option is not
popular, however, and Bali TV is clearly the channel of choice for many Balinese,
especially in the more conservative areas outside the main urban centres.19 As a result,
the combined media of BPMG have a disproportionate influence on the dissemination
of information and the formation of public opinion in Bali. Such was the media environ-
ment in which public understanding of the Pilkada campaigns unfolded in 2005.
An unusual aspect of Bali TV’s programming is the practice of demanding payment
from individuals, groups or organisations for coverage of their activities on Bali TV.20
These payments, known as “donations to support human and technical resources”,
apply to people such as aspiring pop music groups seeking exposure. But payments are
also demanded for “news” coverage of various activities of businesses, government and
NGOs, which are presented alongside fee-free items deemed to be newsworthy in them-
selves. Fees for coverage start from as low as Rp. 400,000 (A$65) but can go much
higher and constitute a significant source of income to cover production costs for the
channel. This practice somewhat blurs the line between advertising and editorial
content, and did so during the Pilkada campaigns.21
When candidates visited the imposing headquarters of BPMG (Gedung Pers Bali
K. Nadha), they were received in person by Satria Naradha.22 These visits were widely
reported both in Bali Post and on Bali TV. While new to Balinese local politics, there was
a precedent for this somewhat ritualised visiting and reception of candidates in the 1999 Indo-
nesian General Election andGolkar convention, when candidates for the presidency all came
to Bali. At this time almost all candidates for the Indonesian Presidency, including Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono and Megawati Sukarnoputri, came to Bali TV. In the case of
Megawati, the incumbent president at that time, her visit was run as live “breaking news”
on Bali TV. Like the visits to puri, such visits are referred to as dharma suaka or simakrama.23
These visits have obvious material benefits for both parties. BPMG boost their profile as
powerful media in the eyes of public and politicians alike; the visiting candidates, apart
from getting wide exposure in all media of BPMG, are also able to send a message to Bali-
nese society as if they were state dignitaries being welcomed personally to Bali. But at
another level, these rituals of visitation conveyed subtle messages in the language of an
older form of politics.
The Politics of Prasasti
There is more to dharma suaka/simakrama than a simple exchange of material benefits.
One of the main elements of the visits of dignitaries in previous years was the signing of
The Media and Cultural Revival in the 2005 Local Election in Bali 175
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prasasti [inscribed stone tablets] proclaiming their support for Ajeg Bali, a new movement
of Balinese cultural revival, sponsored and promoted by BPMG and associated closely
with Satria Naradha. At the Gedung Pers Bali K. Nadha dozens of prasasti have been
signed since 1999 by various leaders and political figures.
Prasasti have two sets of associations in Bali: historically as the means by which rulers
made public and lasting proclamations; and in religious contexts, along with palm-leaf
manuscripts [lontar], as the vehicles in which sacred ritual knowledge was enshrined
and preserved (Creese, 1997; Hobart et al., 1996, pp. 24–31). The use of prasasti, even
the terminology itself, thus had the effect of making an implicit analogy between the insti-
tution of BPMG and the ancient kingdoms of Bali, and between Satria Naradha and the
kings of old.
The layout of the prasasti at Gedung Pers Bali K. Nadha reinforces this impression.The
main tablet commemorating the founding of Ajeg Bali, dated 23 May 2003, is written in
two scripts, Roman and Balinese. It reads “dengan semangat persatuan mari kita ajegkan
Bali” [with spirit of unity let us keep Bali standing up strong]. Naradha’s name is inscribed
at the top of the list, on the same level as the Governor of Bali, and above the deputy gov-
ernor and all the heads of districts. In addition the prasasti are located not in some central,
neutral or common location, but at the headquarters of BPMG, to which the dignitaries
come, rather than Naradha going to their offices.
While the visits of Pilkada candidates in 2005 no longer involved the signing of pra-
sasti, they still took a somewhat ritualised form that followed precedents set by the pra-
sasti-signings. Like the state dignitaries, the candidates came in person to the BPMG
building. On arrival they introduced themselves formally and then proclaimed their
support for Ajeg Bali. In return they requested support from BPMG. Naradha responded
by encouraging candidates to strengthen their commitment to make Bali ajeg [upright,
firm]. This was all widely covered by Bali TV and other media of BPMG. But Ajeg
Bali is more than just a name on a prasasti; it formed the background of public opinion
to the whole Pilkada and to a degree even set its agenda.
Ajeg Bali
Ajeg is a Balinese word, not often used in everyday speech, meaning to stand upright,
strong, firm; it implies getting Bali back on its feet or at least keeping it there. The
origins of the term are uncertain, but the first recorded public use was at the opening of
Bali TV in 2002, in a speech by the Governor of Bali in which he said “the noble
mission and vision of Bali TV is the promotion and mengajegkan of Balinese tradition
and culture to grow together with tourism” (Darma Putra, 2004a).24 The idea, and the
term, in its noun form Ajeg caught on among the BPMG leadership, and in August of
the following year, as part of the celebration of the 55th anniversary of the founding of
Bali Post, BPMG sponsored a seminar on Ajeg Bali. Some of this discussion was sub-
sequently published as a special supplement celebrating the anniversary of Bali Post.
This supplement was then published as a book entitled Ajeg Bali Sebuah Cita-cita. Bali
Post also published another book, Bali Menuju Jagadhita, Aneka Perspektif (2004), con-
sisting of articles by leading Balinese intellectuals exploring the problems facing Bali and
suggesting solutions.25 As well as selling them in bookstores, Satria Naradha presents
these books as gifts to visitors to BPMG. Both books claim that Ajeg Bali is no empty
slogan – “not a stagnant concept but ideas and strategy that need to be struggled for in
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order for Bali to prosper” (2003).26 But what Ajeg Bali means in practice, especially to
ordinary Balinese, is somewhat less clear (Darma Putra, 2005a).
The PR and Marketing manager of BPMG, Made Nariana, described it as “. . . a moral
movement . . .about making Balinese culture sustainable . . ., and includes things like encour-
agement and sponsorship of ritual sacrifice, praying competitions etc.” (interview, 22 June
2005). The chief of police in Bali, Made Mangku Pastika, interviewed on Bali TV on the
occasion of his 54th birthday, said “you ask me how tomeng-ajeg-kanBali? – stop gambling”
(‘Seputar Bali’, 22 June 2005). Examples cited by Schulte-Nordholt include: “. . .we should
go back to the beginning, back to the pure and peaceful Bali, when things were in order and
true . . .”, “Ajeg means that Bali is safe and can resist terrorists”, “. . .an answer to modern-
isation without substance” (2005, p. xx), “Making Bali ajeg is defending our customs and
traditions that are beginning to fade. . .” (Allen and Palermo, 2004, citing N. Suryawan).
Similarly, in mid 2005 it was heard used in the following contexts, and with the follow-
ing meanings and references: as an exhortation by an agricultural scientist to farmers
to grow organically; at the conclusion of a conversation with a friend about the threat of
Javanese immigration and Islam to Balinese culture: “Ajeg Bali is about the same thing
– it means straight, true, unwavering – but what it really means . . . is security [aman]”;
in a discussion among men singing sacred texts [mabasan] in a temple as the economic
process by which investment in ritual provides economic benefits and growth for all; by
a couple of young and well-educated but not very affluent aristocrats – that Islamic-Java-
nese immigration is a real threat to Bali but that “shutting the gate” is “too fanatical” and
the real answer lies in strengthening Balinese culture from the inside by such means as edu-
cation, supporting agriculture and improving the “human resources” [sumber daya
manusia] of Bali. As several writers including Dwipayana (2003) and Picard (forthcoming)
have noted, the genius of the concept lies in the way it taps into and mobilises a widely-held
Figure 1. Ajeg Bali inscription by President Megawati (Darma Putra)
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range of public concerns. It is formulated with sufficient vagueness to accommodate almost
any meaning, and to be manipulated by powerful actors for their own ends.
From its formation in 2002 until thePilkada in 2005,Bali TV slowly but surely became the
voice of Ajeg Bali in ever more active ways. All of its 300 employees are Balinese: this not
only provides jobs for locals but is linked to a commitment to develop Balinese culture. Its
entire program is underpinned by Ajeg Bali ideology. There is a weekly program called
Ajeg Bali, an interactive public forum in which issues of Balinese arts, society and culture
are discussed with experts in the studio. This and other similar programs provide opportunities
for ordinary Balinese to learn, discuss and even criticise their culture. In a more concrete vein,
BPMG, via Bali TV, held competitions for Balinese pop songs and festivals of child dancers
and puppeteers. It has also organised and sponsored rituals to spiritually clean Bali and ask
God to protect Bali – another responsibility traditionally associated with rulers.27
Bali TV has not only appropriated and developed the discourse of Ajeg Bali (Allen and
Palermo, 2004), but implements it in concrete ways to develop Bali culturally and spiri-
tually, as well as economically. The main vehicle for the latter is a new institution
known as Koperasi Krama Bali.
Koperasi Krama Bali
In early 2005, in the lead up to the Pilkada, Satria Naradha announced with characteristic
fanfare and media coverage the formation, under the umbrella of Ajeg Bali, of Koperasi
Krama Bali (KKB). A literal translation of the term is “the cooperative of the people of
Bali”, but it is open to interpretation in different ways. The term koperasi has long been
used throughout Indonesia to refer to local government sponsored cooperatives of
various kinds that provide financial support, mostly in the form of credit for local enter-
prises, especially agricultural ones. In recent years, however, public confidence in them
has waned as a result of widespread reports of financial mismanagement and corruption.
So the climate in which KKB appeared, coinciding with the re-launching of the daily news-
paper Bisnis Bali [Business [in] Bali], and the initial absence of a clear program of prac-
tical implementation, suggested another more visionary reading, along the lines of “(the
people of) Bali, Inc.”.
In Satria Naradha’s own words, KKB is “an answer to the marginalisation of the small-
scale economy” which will “push the aspirations of the young generation to embrace the
informal sector” (BP, 21 June 2005). Its purpose is to “help strengthen the resilience of
the Balinese economy”, and to help the funding of the informal sector by providing
loans (BP, 22 June 2005). But like Ajeg Bali, it began as something of an empty vessel
into which all Balinese could pour their own dreams and priorities for the economy of
Bali: “to build the strength of the Balinese economy from below” and thus “to become
masters of our own land” (BP, 20 May 2005); to address the post-harvest problems of
the farming sector; to make KKB “transparent” because of the corruption of koperasi of
the past; to make “Balinese-style night markets” flourish; and to make Balinese bakso
[meat balls in noodle soup] sellers and pig merchants able to compete against outsiders
(BP, 28 May 2005). By the time of its official establishment on 26 May 2005, over
3,000 Balinese had formally joined as members, and it had amassed a working capital of
Rp. 50 million. By the time of its registration as a koperasi in early August, its membership
and capital had increased to 5,000 and Rp.1.5 billion respectively (DenPost, 9 July 2005).28
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While KKB operates ostensibly for the economic benefit of Bali as a whole, especially the
less affluent informal, rural and more “traditional” sectors, it is not without its benefits for
BPMG. As the holder and manager of the rapidly growing funds of KKB, BPMG has under
its control a considerable amount of money. Bisnis Bali, originally launched a couple of
years earlier as a twice-weekly newspaper and re-launched as a daily, has become virtually
the official organ of KKB. Consequently, the apparent “ownership” of Ajeg Bali by BPMG
has attracted considerable advertising revenue, especially from businesses anxious to
associate themselves with the project of Ajeg Bali and/or KKB. This was especially so
during the 2004 Presidential and 2005 Pilkada campaigns, when affiliation with Ajeg
Bali and KKB became central issues and was virtually compulsory for candidates.
The Pilkada Campaigns
The Media and Ajeg Bali
From the beginning of the campaign, all candidates announced their candidacy through
Bali Post. Every day, it reported, with scrupulous even-handedness, meetings of opposed
teams of candidates, usually those of the two main parties, Golkar and PDI, along with
their various local constituencies and pledges of support for them. For example, on 25
May, in articles of almost identical length, side-by-side on page 2, it reported on the
daily achievements of both teams in Badung district. Agung-Sudikerta (Golkar) had
visited a farming community in the upland part of the electorate where they had received
pledges of unqualified support, while their support in Mengwi, the hometown of their
leader, remained “solid”. Meanwhile, their opponents, Sumer-Oka (PDI-P) had gained
the support of the various Muslim parties preferred by the (mostly Javanese) immigrant
Figure 2. Ajeg Bali billboard, Denpasar (Darma Putra)
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comminities in the urban and tourist areas.29 Bali TV devoted most of the first half of its
daily evening news program (Seputar Bali) to similarly paired reports.
Both media also focused, as did the government, on the management of the election,
issues of security, and the need for proper conduct by all concerned. Substantive policy
and party affiliation were conspicuous by their almost complete absence. For example
Bali Post reported with approval the admonition of a local community leader that the cam-
paigns be kept “free of the attributes of party politics”, and that of the leaders of campaign
teams that Pilkada would be “a polite and ethical festival of local democracy” (6 June
2002). A few days before the election it quoted an official statement urging voters to
wear Bali-Hindu ritual attire for the occasion (21 June 2005), as they had for the
general election a year earlier. Pilkada, which was supposed to devolve power from the
national to the district level was effectively redefined and repackaged in distinctively
Balinese (i.e. provincial) terms.30
The scrupulously even-handed coverage of all candidates was presumably a function of
their payment of the same fees. But by positioning itself as the promoter of a good election
for the good of Bali, rather than any particular candidate or party, providing publicity to all
candidates equally, and refraining from critical commentary of any kind, BPMG in effect
supported no party and no candidate. As a result candidates and parties alike were more
beholden to the media than the media were to them. By repackaging the election in Balinese
terms, BPMG was also positioning itself as the definer and defender of Balineseness.
KKB and the Visual Language of Traditional Politics
The terminology of dharma suaka and simakrama signals the redefinition of these prac-
tices of visiting and receiving blessings from local puri and BPMG alike, and relocates
Figure 3. Ajeg Bali book cover
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them at least partly from the domain of modern/state politics into a framework of local
tradition. More specifically it re-frames the whole Pilkada in terms of recognisable prac-
tices of deference and hierarchy. This practical recognition takes place at all levels of daily
life in several ways. One of the best known of these is language, in which there are usages
and forms of speech appropriate to and expressive of the respective socio-religious pos-
itions of a pair of conversants (Geertz and Togog, 2005, p. 77). Equally fundamental
and universal, but perhaps more subtle, are the visual indicators of status.
This balance of power in the relationship between politicians and media is evident in
visual form in their membership of KKB. As noted above, persons of lower rank tradition-
ally present themselves at the places of those of higher rank, as exemplified in the lines of
petitioners awaiting the attention of princes and priests. Kings do not visit commoners, but
call for them to present themselves at the puri. Through late May 2005, the candidates
assiduously and humbly presented themselves to local communities as well as palaces,
while BPMG reporters followed them around with equal assiduity. At the same time
however the candidates signed themselves up as members [anggota] of KKB. It was
obviously in their interests to be seen to support this initiative, but to do so they had to
present themselves at the headquarters of KKB. This was none other than the Gedung
Pers Bali K. Nadha, the stronghold of BPMG, where they were duly photographed and
filmed signing the membership list, watched over by its head Satria Naradha. As these
images were published and broadcast, day after day, the relations of power/status
implied were not lost on ordinary Balinese. The candidates were presenting themselves
to Satria Naradha at his palace as if he were a king.
a) Satria N & Sumer-Oka (BP, 20 May 05)
b) Suharto & IMF
c) SN & Dewa Beratha (BP, 17 May 05)
The candidates were not the only ones to sign up to KKB. On 17 May, the top half of the
front page of Bali Post consisted of a large coloured photograph and article showing the
Governor of Bali, Dewa Beratha, signing himself in as member No.1 of KKB, watched
over attentively by a beaming Naradha. Three days later, a strikingly similar front page
Figure 4. President Suharto, with the Regional Director, IMF
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pictured the chairman of the Provincial Parliament of Bali (DPRD) also signing in. In these
cases, however, the signings took place at the offices of the Governor and the parliament
building. While Naradha was in fact paying his respects at their respective palaces, the
photographs were framed to look as though, as in the other cases, they had come to
him. The form of these images, and the message they conveyed, are reminiscent of the
famous (and politically fatal) image of a powerless and humiliated Suharto signing the
documents acquiescing to IMF control over the stumbling economy of Indonesia. This
image was widely read by Indonesians as a sign of Suharto’s loss of power and legitimacy.
While Balinese did not, to our knowledge, make an explicit equation with the image of
Suharto, what we are suggesting is that they read the images of Naradha and politicians
in similar ways.31
Puri Bali TV: A New Theatre State?
It has been suggested that “de-deifying their leaders has (perhaps) been one of television’s
most perduring effects in Bali” (Hobart,1999, p. 282). This may be so, but Hobart was
referring to the state-controlled television of the late New Order period. Since then the
media landscape has changed dramatically, in ways that move forward from the New
Order, but simultaneously refer back to ideas and images that long predate it. We
suggest that a process not of “re-deification” but perhaps of a revisioning of leadership,
in terms of ideas and images derived from tradition, may also be at work in the current
political and media environments. BPMG appears to be representing itself as (something
like) a palace and its head, Satria Naradha as (something like) a king. It is representing
itself thus by a variety of actions that speak to Balinese in traditional languages of hierar-
chy and leadership. BPMG appears to have taken on the traditional responsibility of legit-
imate rulers for the well-being of the island as a whole – socially, politically,
economically and even spiritually. Its near-monopoly of the means of public communi-
cation has enabled it to publicise this widely, but also to provide a subtle sub-text via
the languages of visiting, receiving and granting requests. This text, repeated daily
throughout the Pilkada campaign, suggests the superior status of BPMG to candidates
for the highest political office at district level and arguably even at provincial level.
Figure 5. Satria Naradha with Dewa Beratha, Governor of Bali (Bali Post)
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BPMG also celebrates, publicises and immortalises its achievements and relationships
with persons of high station through the use of prasasti, which are in themselves a
medium associated with rulers of the highest order and ritual sanctity.
Clifford Geertz argued famously (1980) that traditional Balinese polities were “theatre-
states” – constituted less by the devices and strategies of conventional material political
economy than by a symbolic and performative display of their accord with the order of the
cosmos and divine sanction. Most scholars of precolonial Balinese politics find little evi-
dence to support his position, but as one of us has argued elsewhere (MacRae, 2005), there
is nevertheless a kernel of truth in his argument. Ironically, this has become increasingly
apparent in the local politics of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. We
suggest here that a “theatre-state” model may also be a useful one for making sense of
the political agenda and means of the BPMG in the present.32
While BPMG bears little superficial resemblance to a nineteenth-century kingdom, it
is making implicit claims to moral authority not unlike those made by such kingdoms,
in the languages that Geertz believed those kingdoms used. And, like Geertz’s model of
the nineteenth-century kingdoms, BPMG is making its claims not directly in terms of
its particular combination of wealth and power, but indirectly, using this wealth and
power to display its resemblance, if not to the cosmic/divine order, to that of the kingdoms
of the past. From the point of view of BPMG, the actual results of Pilkada appear to have
been little more than a side-show.
Winners and Losers?
In the end, the results of Naradha’s side-show were mixed. The old aristocracies were
neither reinstated as the new rulers of decentralised Bali; nor were they discarded in
favour of a new breed of political beings. In Tabanan and Bangli, the incumbents were
re-elected, apparently more on the basis of their incumbency than any other obvious
factors. The Denpasar mayoralty, in which both teams were closely associated with
rival puri, was also won by the incumbent, but more as a result of their campaign strategies
than their puri affiliations. The team that played most overtly on their royal descent
(Mataram-Agung), in arguably the most conservative electorate of all (Karangasem),
was comprehensively defeated by a combination of jaba and lower aristocracy [gusti]
(Geredeg-Rai). Only in Badung, where it was a close contest between a Kuta businessman
and the raja of Puri Mengwi, does the puri influence seem significant. Sumer-Oka won in
the Kuta electorates and the rural area of Petang, where Oka had some influence. In the
heartland of Mengwi and Abiansemal, however, Agung won convincingly, mostly as a
result of his hereditary authority there, combined with his grass-roots campaign strategy
of listening to the needs of village people. Aristocratic descent thus played a part in
both the campaigns and the results, but a variable part and never in itself a decisive
part. It is best understood as a new/old resource that various candidates drew upon, mobi-
lised and exploited in different ways to different effects.
New Media for Old Kingdoms? Or Old Kingship for New Media?
Toward the end of 2005, after the election, Satria Naradha travelled to most of the districts
of the newly elected bupati to promote KKB and its major program of establishing Bali-
nese in the informal sector. Short courses were run in Denpasar and other districts on how
The Media and Cultural Revival in the 2005 Local Election in Bali 183
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
Qu
ee
ns
la
nd
] 
At
: 
02
:1
8 
6 
Ju
ne
 2
01
0
to make bakso and soto ayam [chicken soup] and members of KKB established themselves
as bakso sellers. Some of these courses were conspicuously attended by bupati or wali-
kota. Their attendance can be seen as a return to Naradha for the political hospitality
given to them by BPMG during their election campaigns. Naradha’s “safari” was once
again similar in form as well as name to that normally performed by a governor. While
under Suharto TV viewers saw the Governor and his activities every night on state TV
(TVRI ), it was now Naradha’s face they saw, especially on Bali TV.
During the Pilkada campaigns, one of the authors was talking casually with a group of
young men (of admittedly critical political persuasion) about the Pilkada, Bali TV and
KKB. One of them commented spontaneously that the real purpose of it all was to
expand the “kerajaan” of Bali TV. Kerajaan is the word Balinese most commonly use
to refer to the precolonial kingdoms of their island. Its literal translation, “in the state
of having a king” (Milner, 1982, p. 9; see also MacRae, 2005), is close in meaning to
the English “kingdom”. When asked if he really meant that Bali Post/TV was like a
kerajaan and Satria Narada like a raja, he said yes, that was exactly what he meant.
One of his companions immediately added, by way of clarification, that “there are two
Governors in Bali now, that one over there (indicating the direction of the Governor’s
office) and this new one”. He was not the only person to tell us that Satria Naradha’s ambi-
tion was to become Governor. Even when we questioned Naradha’s own PR/Marketing
manager about his ultimate ambitions, his immediate response was “oh, do you mean
that ‘two governors’ business?” Our relating of all this is meant not as a prediction
about the future, but to report on the ways in which Balinese interpret these represen-
tations, and thus to reinforce several points emerging from the above discussion.
The first and most evident point is that the new political climate occasioned by local
autonomy in general and local elections in particular has given rise to strikingly new
forms of political campaigning and public interest. Second, the status-assertions of the tra-
ditional elite, which have until recently taken the form of social and ritual precedence
(MacRae, 2005), have emerged as a potent form of what might, following Bourdieu
(1991, p. 230) be called political capital. Third, the political resources deriving from
tradition do not translate automatically into votes: they need to be mobilised and strate-
gically utilised in relation to other newer resources derived from other sources. The
fourth point is the dominant role of the mass media in mediating public knowledge and
opinion about the election, and the fifth is the moral authority and political power that
have accrued to the media by virtue of this role. Sixth is the specific and apparently
quite deliberate ways in which the combined media of the BPMG have exercised this
new power: they effect ends that at once appear to have the highest social good as their
aim, but simultaneously raise and embed their own position through a symbolic language
of status derived from traditional politics. These conclusions perhaps say little in terms of
conventional political science, but what they do suggest, as Geertz did in Negara, is that
factors of deeper historical depth than the New Order period and wider cultural compass
than the formal “political” domain play very real parts in contemporary “political”
processes.33
The contest in the 2005 Pilkada (apart from the mayoralty of Denpasar) was for the
leadership of administrative districts that correspond to the territories over which
the last precolonial kings ruled. One of the explicit reasons for the devolution of more
power to the district rather than to the provincial level was to avoid the potential for
separatist movements based on provincial levels of ethnic, linguistic and often religious
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homogeneity (Aspinall and Fealy, 2003, p. 4). In Bali the provincial level corresponds to
the whole island. The last king to exercise spiritual, if not politico-military, jurisdiction
over the island was deposed and killed by the Dutch in 1908: with him seemed to die
any hope of a politically reunified Bali (Vickers, 1989, p. 76).34 The Dutch are long
gone, but a century after their arrival, with a widespread perception of other common
threats at the door, it seems that neither the sentiments underlying this image of kingship
nor the symbolic practices that helped create and maintain it have disappeared altogether;
and a new kind of theatre-state may yet be emerging in twenty-first century Bali.
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Notes
1. We use the term “traditional” advisedly, to refer in an unproblematised way to political formations, ideas
and practices that predate both the New Order and the colonial period. But they are “traditional” also in
the sense that they are seen in popular Balinese thinking to be both indigenous and surrounded by a
certain aura of ritual sanctity.
For a discussion of the decentralisation policies and their implementation see Seymour and Turner
(2002) and Aspinall and Fealy (2003). For more comprehensive discussion of the background to and
details of the new electoral system, see Jacqueline Vel’s excellent article (2005) and Choi (2004).
2. Golkar is new wine in an old bottle – the official organisation of government during the Suharto regime
reinvented as a modern democratic political party; PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) is associated with
the political legacy of the first president Sukarno, split into two factions, the more prominent one (PDI-P)
headed by Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno and herself the immediate past president. For a
more comprehensive discussion of political parties in the new electoral climate see Choi (2004).
3. The Balinese term puri is conventionally translated as “palace”, and in fact has a very similar range of
referents: to the building, the family, the institution and occasionally the (aristocratic) class as a whole.
4. Only the northern kingdom of Buleleng was taken over by the Dutch in the mid-nineteenth century.
5. For accounts of nineteenth-century kingdoms, see Geertz (1980), MacRae (1997), Schulte-Nordholt
(1996) and Wiener (1995). For their loss of power in the early twentieth century see MacRae (1997),
Schulte-Nordholt (1996) and Vickers (1989). For their turn to business in the 1950s, see Geertz
(1963). On contemporary puri, see MacRae (1997, 2005), Parker (2003), Pedersen (2005). On local poli-
tics in Bali during the late New Order period see Warren (1993).
6. Analyses of the politics of the immediate post-New Order period (e.g. Robison and Hadiz, 2004;
Schwartz, 1999; Renton-Green, 1999; Hasibuan, 1999; Vel, 2005) stress the survival of New Order
elites, as well as the roles of various other parties including the military, Islamic elements, and gangsters
[ preman] but make no mention of traditional aristocracies. However it is also notable that all of these
studies refer to “Indonesia” in a very generalised sense (often in practice reducible to Java or even
Jakarta); none mentions, let alone focuses, on Bali.
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7. It is important however to note that this retreat from the formal political arena was not total. The leaders
of PDI in Bali have long been from Puri Satria and Puri Kesiman, while members of their rival Puri
Pemecutan were prominent in the Golkar of the New Order period. Golkar though was usually led by
former military people such as I Dewa Gede Oka and I Ketut Sundria, and its previous chairman was
I Gusti Ngurah Alit Yudha, son of the independence hero I Gusti Ngurah Rai. The current chairman
however is Cokorda Budi Suryawan, from Puri Ubud, who has emerged as a career politician in the
post-New Order period.
8. Robinson (1995, p. 197, p. 258) has argued convincingly against the reduction of the politics of the
pre-New Order periods to such patterns of “traditional” affiliation and alliance. His point is well
taken, but our point here is that it has been perhaps too well taken and that these almost-forgotten patterns
have remained a significant part of the contemporary social realities of many Balinese to re-emerge into
the formal political arena half a century later.
9. The titles Anak Agung (AA) and Ida Bagus (IB) indicate aristocratic [triwangsa] descent. Names
without such prefixes indicate non-aristocratic [ jaba] descent. In the Pilkada itself, and henceforth
here, the pairs of candidates will be referred to by their combined and hyphenated last names, e.g.
Sumer-Oka.
10. The backroom dimensions of Pilkada 2005 undoubtedly include the inevitable “money politics” and
party affiliations emphasised in other accounts (e.g. Choi, 2004). This essay focuses on other dimensions
of the political process, but part of our argument is that in this election these conventionally political-
economic aspects appear to have been less important than elsewhere and than the factors we focus on
here.
11. Although our reference here is to visits to persons of higher status, the terms are in fact used for all the
visits of candidates to their various constituencies.
12. Our rather generalised reference to “the media” refers primarily to newspapers and television, but
especially to the control over information represented by their combination in the Bali Post Media
Group referred to below.
13. Only one pair of candidates (from Bangli) did not visit, for reasons unknown to us.
14. For accounts (in Indonesian) of Ketut Nadha’s life and work see Dwikora Putra and Supartha (2001).
15. Since then BPMG has moved into partnerships with other local TV stations in Jogjakarta, Semarang,
Bandung and Palembang. For a comprehensive history of the media in Bali see Darma Putra’s PhD
thesis (2003).
16. The media climate during the New Order was obviously more complex and ambiguous than this, as
Sen and Hill’s definitive and nuanced study (2000) shows. Our comments rely heavily on their work
but our purpose is a more generalised picture that no doubt sacrifices subtlety in the interests of com-
parison. But more importantly, Sen and Hill’s analysis is, like most of the political analysis referred to
above, fairly Java-centric and in fact makes no specific reference to Bali, which is significantly differ-
ent in several ways. For this we rely on our own experience and Darma Putra’s own local study
(2003).
17. Unless otherwise noted, all the publications referred to here are in Bahasa Indonesia and translations are
by the authors. Bahasa Indonesia derives from Malay, the precolonial language of trade throughout
(pen)insular Southeast Asia. It became the language of colonial administration and is now the
official national language of bureaucracy, education and communication between people from
different parts of the country. It is spoken with varying degrees of fluency by most people,
especially the younger and the better-educated ones, but is a second language for most people, including
Balinese.
18. In the mid-1960s, the military, as part of its statutory function in civil society, established newspapers in
most provinces of Indonesia, including one in Bali called Angkatan Bersendjata, as the voice of military
and government. It was renamed Nusa Tenggara in 1978 and Nusa in 1998. Since the mid-1980s, the
Surabaya daily Jawa Pos expanded its distribution and coverage to Bali, presumably because of the
large population of East Javanese immigrants there. In the late 1990s, it added a supplement Radar
Bali providing local news.
19. The other locally based TV channel, TVRI Bali, has lost most of its viewers because it is seen as the voice
of a largely discredited government, or even as a remnant of the New Order. Ironically, since the fall of
Suharto it has also suffered from management and financial problems.
20. Although unusual nowadays, this practice is not unknown in Indonesia. It was in fact practised in the past
by the state broadcaster TVRI.
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21. We understand that candidates paid a flat fee of Rp.700,000 for general coverage of their campaigns, but
also that Bali Post newspaper charged more, Rp 1 million, which they described as “dana punia”[dona-
tion]. However, it is not clear exactly what this covered, as some aspects of their campaigns would have
been covered as news anyway. Nor do we know whether any candidates declined to pay for coverage.
But they did also pay for advertising in addition to this flat fee.
22. Satria named his new headquarters after his father, the founder of the Bali Post, “The K. Nadha Bali
Press Building”.
23. Local party leaders played an important role in mediating between candidates and the chief of Bali TV in
order to make the visit well organised and politically meaningful propaganda.
24. “. . .misi dan visi Bali TV yang sangat mulia yaitu mengembangkan dan mengajegkan adat dan budaya
Bali ditambah dengan pariwisata Bali. . .” Mengajegkan is the verb form of ajeg.
25. These titles translate loosely as “Ajeg Bali: an ideal” and “Bali approaches prosperity: various
perspectives”.
26. “ajeg Bali” bukanlah konsep stagnan, tetapi cita-cita dan strategi yang terus harus diperjuangkan untuk
membuat Bali sejahtera”.
27. As well as its Ajeg Bali content, Bali TV programming does include some programs of wider interest and
more global origins such as a popular serialisation of the Indian epic Mahabharata and some programs
from Voice of America.
28. Rp. ¼ Rupiah, the currency of Indonesia, which at the time of writing is worth about Rp. 7000 per $A.
29. The names Agung-Sudikerta and Sumer-Oka refer to the names of the pairs of candidates.
30. It has been noted by several observers, including one of the reviewers of this article, that much of the
style and flavour (even some of the terminology) of the electoral process promoted by BPMG is
eerily and ironically reminiscent of that of New Order elections and indeed the regime’s overarching
ideology of Pancasila (as described by Morfit, 1981). It has also been suggested that other contemporary
practices under the umbrella of Ajeg Bali, especially those relating to local security, are reminiscent of
the New Order. We tend to agree and this is certainly a subject for further research.
31. The argument of this section implies some assumptions as to how these visual images are read by “ordin-
ary Balinese”, and as Mark Hobart (1999) has reminded us, Balinese are by no means uncritical believers
of all they see/hear on television. While we have little evidence of how Balinese read these messages
in such a direct form as interviews, our primary evidence, indeed the primary stimulus for this whole
argument, lies in Darma Putra’s own reactions as a Balinese, reinforced by his wider perceptions, as
a journalist, of Balinese public opinion, supported again by MacRae’s impressions over the period
under consideration.
32. The final revisions to this paper were made on the day we heard of Clifford Geertz’s passing, signalling
the end of an era in Balinese studies. We would like to take this opportunity to salute his influence on
this, possibly the first work in which his legacy will live on posthumously.
33. The aim of this paper is not a critique of political science; what we refer to here is a tendency to focus on
the formal structures of political process, including parties, policies, leaders and the machinations of
power relations between them. Our point here is that focus on these tends to ignore more subtle dimen-
sions of the “political” embedded in ostensibly different social realms.
34. For an account of this last king and his loss of power, see Wiener (1995).
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